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Landmark Federal Appeals Ruling Holds Sexual Orientation Discrimination Violates Title VII

Posted on: April 5th, 2017 by Art Leonard No Comments

The full bench of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit, based in Chicago, substantially advanced the cause of gay rights on April 4, releasing an unprecedented decision in Kimberly Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College, 2017 WL 1230393, holding that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which applies generally to all employers with fifteen or more employees as well as many federal, state and local government operations, prohibits discriminating against a person because of their sexual orientation.  The text of the statute does not mention sexual orientation, so the interpretive question for the court was whether discriminating against somebody because they are lesbian, gay or bisexual can be considered a form of sex discrimination.

What was particularly amazing about the affirmative decision, the first to rule this way by a federal appeals court, was that the 7th Circuit is composed overwhelmingly of Republican appointees, many of whom were appointed as long ago as the Reagan Administration.  Although the lead opinion for the Circuit was written by Chief Judge Diane Pamela Wood, who was appointed by Bill Clinton, the 8-member majority of the 11-judge bench included more Republicans than Democrats.  Many of the judges in the majority could be generally characterized as judicial conservatives.

Wood’s opinion was joined by Frank Easterbrook (Reagan appointee), Ilana Rovner (George H. W. Bush appointee), Ann Claire Williams (Clinton appointee), and David F. Hamilton (the only Obama appointee on the Circuit). Richard Posner (Reagan appointee) wrote a concurring opinion.  Joel Martin Flaum (Reagan appointee) wrote a concurring opinion which was joined by Kenneth Francis Ripple (Reagan appointee).  The dissent by Diane S. Sykes (George W. Bush appointee) was joined by Michael Stephen Kanne (Reagan appointee) and William Joseph Bauer (Ford appointee).  Ripple and Bauer are senior judges who were sitting on the en banc hearing because they were part of the three-judge panel (with Judge Rovner) that ruled on the case last year.  The Circuit has 11 authorized positions, but there are two vacancies among the active judges, part of the Republican Senate’s legacy of refusing to confirm most of President Obama’s judicial appointees during his second term.

The Circuit’s decision to grant en banc review clearly signaled a desire to reconsider the issue, which Judge Rovner had called for doing in her panel opinion. Rovner then made a persuasive case that changes in the law since the 7th Circuit had previously ruled negatively on the question called out for reconsideration.  Those who attended the oral argument on November 30 or listened to the recording on the court’s website generally agreed that the circuit was likely to overrule its old precedents, the only mystery being who would write the opinion, what theories they would use, and who would dissent.

The lawsuit was filed by Kimberly Hively, a lesbian who was working as an adjunct professor at the college, which is located in South Bend, Indiana. Despite years of successful teaching, her attempts to secure a full-time tenure-track position were continually frustrated and finally her contract was not renewed under circumstances that led her to believe it was because of her sexual orientation.  Since Indiana’s state law does not forbid sexual orientation discrimination, and South Bend’s ordinance (which does forbid sexual orientation discrimination) would not apply to the state college, she filed suit in federal court under Title VII.  She represented herself at that stage.  The trial judge, Rudy Lozano, granted the college’s motion to dismiss the case on the ground that 7th Circuit precedents exclude sexual orientation discrimination claims under Title VII.

Hively obtained representation from Lambda Legal on appeal. The three-judge panel rejected her appeal, while two of the judges urged that the precedents be reconsidered.

Judge Wood found that several key Supreme Court decisions have broadened the meaning of “because of sex” in Title VII, to the extent that she could write that “in the years since 1964, Title VII has been understood to cover far more than the simple decision of an employer not to hire a woman for Job A, or a man for Job B.” The broadening includes launching a complex law of sexual harassment, including same-sex sexual harassment, and discrimination against a person who fails to conform to “a certain set of gender stereotypes.”

As have many of the other judges who have written on this issue, Wood quoted from Justice Antonin Scalia’s opinion for the unanimous court in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998), the same-sex harassment case, in which, after noting that “male-on-male sexual harassment in the workplace was assuredly not the principal evil Congress was concerned with when it enacted Title VII,” this did not mean that the statute could not be interpreted to apply to such a situation. “But statutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils,” Scalia wrote, “and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by which we are governed.”

Woods found convincing Hively’s contention, argued to the court by Lambda Legal’s Greg Nevins, that two alternative theories would support her claim. The first follows a “comparative method in which we attempt to isolate the significance of the plaintiff’s sex to the employer’s decision: has she described a situation in which, holding all other things constant and changing only her sex, she would have been treated the same way?”  The second rests on an intimate association claim, relying on the Supreme Court’s 1967 ruling striking down state laws barring interracial marriages, Loving v. Virginia.  The Supreme Court held that a ban on interracial marriage was a form of race discrimination, because the state was taking race in account in deciding whom somebody could marry.  Similarly here, an employer is taking sex into account when discriminating against somebody because they associate intimately with members of the same sex.  After briefly describing these two theories, Wood wrote, “Although the analysis differs somewhat, both avenues end up in the same place: sex discrimination.”

Woods noted at least two rulings by other circuits under Title VII that had adapted Loving’s interracial marriage analysis to an employment setting, finding race discrimination where an employer discriminated against persons who were in interracial relationships, Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life Insurance Co., 791 F.2 888 (11th Cir. 1986), and Holcomb v. Iona College, 521 F.3d 130 (2nd Cir. 2008).  These citations were a bit ironic, since the 11th and 2nd Circuits have in recent weeks rejected sexual orientation discrimination claims under Title VII, in which the plaintiffs advanced the same analogy to support their Title VII claims.  These recent opinions were by three-judge panels that held themselves to be bound by prior circuit rulings.  Lambda Legal has already filed a petition for en banc review in the 11th Circuit case, and counsel for plaintiff in the 2nd Circuit case is thinking about doing the same.

Ultimately, Wood acknowledged, “It would require considerable calisthenics to remove the ‘sex’ from ‘sexual orientation.’ The effort to do so has led to confusing and contradictory results, as our panel opinion illustrated so well.  The EEOC concluded, in its Baldwin decision, that such an effort cannot be reconciled with the straightforward language of Title VII.  Many district courts have come to the same conclusion.  Many other courts have found that gender identity claims are cognizable under Title VII.”

Woods recited the now well-worn argument about how it is a basic inconsistency in the law that a person can enter into a same-sex marriage on Saturday and then be fired without legal recourse for having done so when they show up at the workplace on Monday. That is still the state of the law in a majority of the states.

Wood acknowledged that this decision does not end the case. Because Hively’s original complaint was dismissed by the district court without a trial, she has not yet been put to the test of proving that her sexual orientation was a motivating factor in the college’s decision not to hire her or renew her adjunct contract.  And, what passed unspoken, the college might decide to petition the Supreme Court to review this ruling, although the immediate reaction of a college spokesperson was that the school – which has its own sexual orientation non-discrimination policy – denies that it discriminated against Hively, and is ready to take its chances at trial.

Judge Posner submitted a rather odd concurring opinion, perhaps reflecting the oddity of some of his comments during oral argument, including the stunning question posed to the college’s lawyer: “Why are there lesbians?” Posner, appointed by Reagan as an economic conservative and social libertarian, has evolved into a forceful advocate for LGBT rights, having satisfied himself that genetics and biology play a large part in determining sexual identity and that it is basically unfair to discriminate against LGBT people without justification.  He wrote the Circuit’s decision striking down bans on same-sex marriage in Indiana and Wisconsin in 2014.

In this opinion, he takes on the contention that it is improper for the court to purport to “interpret” the language adopted by Congress in 1964 to cover sexual orientation discrimination. After reviewing various models of statutory interpretation, he insisted that “interpretation can mean giving a fresh meaning to a statement (which can be a statement found in a constitutional or statutory text) – a meaning that infuses the statement with vitality and significance today.”  He used as his prime example judicial interpretation of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, adopted “long before there was a sophisticated understanding of the economics of monopoly and competition.”  As a result of changing times and new knowledge, he observed, “for more than thirty years the Act has been interpreted in conformity to the modern, not the nineteenth-century, understanding of the relevant economics.” Basically, the courts have “updated” the Act in order to keep it relevant to the present.

He argued that the same approach should be brought to interpreting Title VII, adopted more than half a century ago. This old law “invites an interpretation that will update it to the present, a present that differs markedly from the era in which the Act was enacted.”  And, after reviewing the revolution in understanding of human sexuality and public opinion about it, he concluded it was time to update Title VII to cover sexual orientation claims, even though “it is well-nigh certain that homosexuality, male or female, did not figure in the minds of the legislators who enacted Title VII.”  Although some of the history he then recites might arouse some quibbles, he was able to summon some pointed examples of Justice Scalia employing this method in his interpretation of the Constitution regarding, for example, flag-burning and an individual right to bear arms.

“Nothing has changed more in the decades since the enactment of the statute than attitudes toward sex,” wrote Posner, going on to recite the litigation history of the struggle for marriage equality that culminated in 2015 with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Obergefell v. Hodges.

Although it might sound odd at times as a judicial opinion, Posner’s concurrence is eminently readable and packed full of interesting information, including his list of “homosexual men and women (and also bisexuals, defined as having both homosexual and heterosexual orientations)” who have made “many outstanding intellectual and cultural contributions to society (think for example of Tchaikovsky, Oscar Wilde, Jane Addams, Andre Gide, Thomas Mann, Marlene Dietrich, Bayard Rustin, Alan Turing, Alec Guinness, Leonard Bernstein, Van Cliburn, and James Baldwin – a very partial list).”

This brought to the writer’s mind a famous paragraph in Supreme Court Justice Harry Blackmun’s opinion rejecting a challenge to the traditional anti-trust exemption for professional baseball, in which Blackmun included his own list of the greatest professional baseball players in history (compiled through a survey of the Supreme Court’s members and their young legal clerks).

Instead of pursuing Judge Wood’s line of reasoning, Posner was ready to declare that sexual orientation discrimination is a form of sex discrimination without such detailed analysis. “The most tenable and straightforward ground for deciding in favor of Hively is that while in 1964 sex discrimination meant discrimination against men or women as such and not against subsets of men or women such as effeminate men or mannish women, the concept of sex discrimination has since broadened in light of the recognition, which barely existed in 1964, that there are significant numbers of both men and women who have a sexual orientation that sets them apart from the heterosexual members of their genetic sex (male or female), and that while they constitute a minority their sexual orientation is not evil and does not threaten society.  Title VII in terms forbids only sex discrimination, but we now understand discrimination against homosexual men and women to be a form of sex discrimination; and to paraphrase [Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.], ‘We must consider what this country has become in deciding what that [statute] has reserved.’”

In his concurring opinion Judge Flaum took a narrower approach, noting that Title VII was amended in 1991 to provide that “an unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that … sex … was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.” In other words, discrimination does not have to be “solely” because of sex to violate Title VII.  It is enough if the individual’s sex was part of the reason for the discrimination.  In light of this, Flaum (and Ripple, who joined his opinion) would look to the analogy with discrimination against employees in interracial relationships.  In addition, he noted, “One cannot consider a person’s homosexuality without also accounting for their sex: doing so would render ‘same’ and ‘own’ meaningless” in dictionary definitions that define homosexuality in terms of  whether somebody is attracted to persons of “the same” or “their own” sex.  Clearly, “sex” is involved when people are discriminated against because they are gay.

Judge Sykes’s dissent channeled scores of cases going back to the early years of Title VII and argued against the method of statutory interpretation used by the various opinions making up the majority. “The question before the en banc court is one of statutory interpretation,” she wrote.  “The majority deploys a judge-empowering, common-law decision method that leaves a great deal of room for judicial discretion.  So does Judge Posner in his concurrence.  Neither is faithful to the statutory text, read fairly, as a reasonable person would have understood it when it was adopted.  The result is a statutory amendment courtesy of unelected judges.  Judge Posner admits this; he embraces and argues for this conception of judicial power.  The majority does not, preferring instead to smuggle in the statutory amendment under cover of an aggressive reading of loosely related Supreme Court precedents.  Either way, the result is the same: the circumvention of the legislative process by which the people govern themselves.”

Although Sykes conceded that sexual orientation discrimination is wrong, she was not ready to concede that one could find it illegal by interpretation of a 1964 statute prohibiting sex discrimination at a time when the legislature could not possibly have been intending to ban discrimination against LGBT people. As Posner pointed out, that issue wasn’t on the radar in 1964.  Thus, to Sykes, Bauer and Kanne, it was not legitimate for a court to read this into the statute under the guise of “interpretation.”

Speculating about the ultimate fate of this decision could go endlessly on. There are fierce debates within the judiciary about acceptable methods of interpreting statutes, and various theories about how to deal with aging statutes that are out of sync with modern understandings.

Posner’s argument for judicial updating allows for the possibility that if Congress disagrees with what a court has done, it can step in and amend the statute, as Congress has frequently amended Title VII to overrule Supreme Court interpretations with which it disagreed. (For example, Congress overruled the Supreme Court’s decision that discrimination against pregnant women was not sex discrimination in violation of Title VII.)  Posner’s approach will be familiar to those who have read the influential 1982 book by then-Professor (now 2nd Circuit Judge) Guido Calabresi, “A Common Law for the Age of Statutes,” suggesting that courts deal with the problem of ancient statutes and legislative inertia by “updating” statutes through interpretation to deal with contemporary problems, leaving it to the legislature to overrule the courts if they disagree.  This method is more generally accepted in other common law countries (British Commonwealth nations), such as Australia, South Africa, India and Canada, than in the United States, but it clearly appeals to Posner as eminently practical.

So far the Republican majorities in Congress have not been motivated to address this issue through amendments to Title VII, or to advance the Equality Act, introduced during Obama’s second term, which would amend all federal sex discrimination laws to address sexual orientation and gender identity explicitly. Perhaps they will be provoked to act, however, if the question gets up to the Supreme Court and the 7th Circuit’s view prevails.

With the possibility of appeals now arising from three different circuits with different views of the issue, Supreme Court consideration of this question is highly likely. Public opinion polls generally show overwhelming support for prohibiting sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination in the workplace, which might serve as a brake on conservative legislators who would otherwise respond adversely to a Supreme Court ruling approving the 7th Circuit’s holding.

Wide-Ranging LGBT Equality Bill Introduced in Congress for the First Time

Posted on: July 23rd, 2015 by Art Leonard No Comments

The Equality Act, introduced by Senator Jeff Merkley of Oregon and Representative David Cicilline of Rhode Island on July 23, 2015, is the first truly comprehensive federal measure attempting to provide legal equality for LGBT people in the United States.  It goes far beyond all prior bills on this topic, because none of the bills introduced in Congress included gender identity until relatively recently and the main federal bills of recent vintage have been narrowly focused on employment discrimination.  By contrast, this bill gathers together references to the broad range of federal anti-discrimination statutes and inserts both “sexual orientation” and “gender identity” into every list of forbidden reasons for discrimination.  Additionally, correcting a long-standing omission, it also adds “sex” to the list of prohibited grounds where it is not already included, most prominently in the public accommodations provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

The bill as proposed would apply to public accommodations (establishments providing goods, services or programs to the public), public facilities, public education, employment (both governmental and non-governmental), housing, credit, and federal jury service.  The public accommodations provisions had not been revised in the half-century since the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was adopted, so the drafters took the opportunity to introduce a new definition that will make clear that every establishment or operation that provides goods, services or programs to the public is covered, regardless of whether it has a fixed physical location.  This last point was important to express because some state public accommodations laws have been narrowly interpreted to apply only to the issue of equal access to particular places where goods or services are provided.  Because of the limits of federal jurisdiction, however, the Civil Rights Act’s employment provisions do not apply to small local businesses with fewer than 15 employees, and this bill would not change that.  Similarly, the Fair Housing Act has not been applied to owner-occupied rental housing or roommate decisions, and this bill would not change that.  Some state and local anti-discrimination laws do address smaller employers and residential property owners, but those operations have generally not been considered appropriate for federal regulation.

Some of the most significant aspects of the bill have to do with the things it doesn’t say.

For example, unlike the various versions of the Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA) introduced in Congress over the past twenty years, this bill does not exclude disparate impact claims.  ENDA would have prohibited only disparate treatment — situations where an employer adopted a policy or made a decision which explicitly treated one group of people worse than another group of people, or where under the circumstances it could be shown that a decision was motivated by discriminatory animus against a particular group.  But Title VII of the Civil Rights Act has long been interpreted by the Supreme Court to extend to situations where an employer adopts a “facially neutral” policy or practice that has the effect of disadvantaging people because of their group identity as defined by a prohibited reason for discrimination.  For example, in an early case the Supreme Court said that an employer who  suddenly adopted a high school diploma requirement after Title VII went into effect was violating the ban on race discrimination, because that requirement screened out a much greater number of African-American applicants then applicants from other racial groups.  In such cases, the Court ruled (and Congress later amended the statute to provide) that an employer who adopts a policy or practice that has such a disparate impact may escape liability by proving that the practice is consistent with business necessity.  Translated into everyday language, the employer needs to show that the particular skill, experience, credential or characteristic involved is actually important to do the job.

Another example of a significant omission in the employment discrimination provisions has to do with the “bona fide occupational qualification” (BFOQ) defense.  Title VII of the Civil Rights Act allows for the possibility that sometimes sex, religion or national origin may actually be a legitimate qualification for a particular job, so it provides that it is not an “unlawful employment practice for an employer make an employment decision based on sex, religion or national origin” where one of those characteristics is a “bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise.”  Notably absent from that list is “race or color,” as Congress concluded that race or color can never be a bona fide occupational qualification.  Thus, it is interesting that the Equality Bill does not add “sexual orientation” or “gender identity” to the BFOQ list.  The drafters of this bill have made the judgment that sexual orientation or gender identity can never be a “bona fide occupational qualification.”  They could not imagine a situation where an employer should be able to say that they will never hire a gay or transgender person for a particular position regardless of that person’s knowledge, skill, experience, or other qualifications for the job.  Expect this to become a topic of some debate when the bill gets its first committee hearing.

Of course, as Title VII includes “sex” as potentially being a bona fide occupation, the Equality Bill anticipates potential issues by providing that where sex is a bona fide occupational qualification, “individuals are recognized as qualified in accordance with their gender identity.”  That means that if an employer can show that a particular job can only be filled by a man, a transgender man would not be disqualified from that job, and if only a woman could do the job, then a transgender woman would not be disqualified from that job.  Federal courts have emphasized that the BFOQ exception should be very narrowly construed, putting a heavy burden on employers to show that the overwhelming majority of women would not be able to perform a job in question in a way that would fulfill the employer’s legitimate needs.  The leading case involved applications from women for positions as guards in maximum security all-male prisons housing violent sex offenders, and Supreme Court (by a divided vote) concluded that the state could exclude women from those jobs on the ground that their presence in that environment would likely provoke serious security problems.  But municipal employers quickly failed in their attempts to exclude women as police officers or fire fighters under this theory.

Of course, in tandem with this BFOQ section is a provision allowing religiously-affiliated educational institutions to limit their hiring to adherents to their religion.  This is a potential flash-point when it comes to LGBT applicants and employees, as we have seen with parochial schools firing teachers after their same-sex marriages come to the attention of administrators.  Interestingly, the Equality Bill does not broaden this religious exemption to expressly allow religiously-affiliated educational institutions to refuse to hire LGBT people because the religion objects to homosexuality or transgender status.  But there is something else unsaid in Title VII that is pertinent to this issue.  The Supreme Court has recognized a “ministerial exemption” for religious organizations under the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause, and has construed it to extend beyond employment of priests, ministers, rabbis and other “ordained” religious leaders to employees of religious schools who perform “ministerial” functions, such as teaching religious doctrine or participating in leading religious activities.  One suspects that courts will apply this ministerial exemption to shield religious schools from Title VII claims by LGBT individuals whose job functions would fall within that category when the employer claims that it would be incompatible with the school’s religious mission to employ them.  When this bill finally becomes law, expect this to be an area of contention.  There is already a growing volume of litigation in which discharged employees are contesting the scope of the ministerial exemption in religiously-affiliated educational institutions, and it is likely that the additional of sexual orientation and gender identity to Title VII will add to that.

It is worth noting, in this connection, that the BFOQ provision allows employers to discriminate based on religion when that is a bona fide occupational qualification, but Title VII itself does not allow religious employers to discriminate on the basis of race or color, or the other Title VII characteristics when they would not qualify as a BFOQ.  However, the ministerial exception would obviously shelter the Catholic Church from Title VII liability for refusing to let women be priests, or from taking national origin in account in deciding to make decisions about which priests to assign to which parishes, since the constitutional protection basically gives a religious organization a free hand in selecting its ministers, defining their jobs and determining their benefits.

The Equality Bill does directly address religion in another way, including a provision to reconcile the Equality Act with the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), which was passed by Congress in reaction to a Supreme Court decision in 1990 that held that the Free Exercise Clause does not excuse people from complying with general laws that do not directly target religious practices.  In RFRA as it was originally passed, Congress said that neither the federal government nor state or local governments could impose a substantial burden on a person’s religious practices unless the government had a compelling public objective for doing so and the law it adopted was the least intrusive alternative way to achieve that objective.  The Supreme Court subsequently said that Congress did not have authority to apply RFRA to state and local governments, so it now works only as a limitation on the burdens imposed by federal law.  Some states have moved to fill that “gap” by adopting state-level RFRA statutes, which have now become flash-points in the battles surrounding marriage equality.

More recently, the Supreme Court has ruled that federal RFRA’s protection of “persons” extends to legal persons as defined in the U.S. Code, which includes business corporations.  In the infamous case of Hobby Lobby Stores v. Burwell, the Court said that a family-owned corporation whose owners had religious objections to certain kinds of contraception could not be required under the Affordable Care Act to provide coverage for those forms of contraception for their employees.  Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s dissent sounded the alarm on discrimination, suggesting that some employers might rely on RFRA to discriminate based on their religious beliefs against, for example, gay people.  She cited a case where a gym owned by a Christian fundamentalist had excluded gay people from membership in violation of a state anti-discrimination law, and the state courts had ruled that the policy against discrimination outweighed the owner’s religious objections.  Would that case come out the same way under the Supreme Court’s interpretation of RFRA?  In his opinion for the Supreme Court, Justice Samuel Alito said that RFRA could not be used to defend against a race discrimination claim, leaving open the question whether it could be used to defend against other kinds of discrimination claims.  The drafters of the Equality Act have anticipated that issue, providing specifically that federal RFRA “shall not provide a claim concerning, or a defense to a claim under, a covered title, or provide a basis for challenging the application or enforcement of a covered title.”  This language refers to the various anti-discrimination titles of the U.S. Code that are mentioned in the bill.

Taking on one of the most contentious issues in debates over gender identity discrimination, the Equality Bill’s employment section provides that “an individual shall not be denied access to a shared facility, including a restroom, a locker room, and a dressing room, in according with the individual’s gender identity.”

Over the past few years, federal agencies and courts have begun to accept the argument that discrimination because of sexual orientation or gender identity is a kind of sex discrimination, that would already be covered by existing statutes.  The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has issued rulings to that effect, most recently on sexual orientation just a week ago.  The Department of Housing and Urban Development has recognized gender identity discrimination claims under the Fair Housing Act, the Education Department has found a basis for some protection in public education, and the Justice Department has also ruled on gender identity claims.  This does not obviate the need for the Equality  Bill, since the courts have not been unanimous in accepting these administrative rulings, and they have yet to be tested in the Supreme Court.  Consequently, the explicit addition of sexual orientation and gender identity to federal civil rights statutes would be more than merely symbolic.  Furthermore, in order to pin down the point, the Equality Bill explicitly provides that were federal civil rights laws ban sex discrimination, that should be interpreted to include sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination as well.  This would “lock in” those administrative rulings as correct interpretations of the statute.

Symbolism is itself important.  One of the purposes for passing civil rights legislation is to prevent such discrimination from happening by declaring a public policy against it and incentivizing employers, business owners, public officials and landlords to avoid litigation by refraining from discrimination.  Surveys of state and local civil rights agencies that have been enforcing laws that forbid sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination reveal that they do not receive a large volume of complaints, most likely because the publicity and debate around the adoption of those local laws helped to change minds and deter discrimination from occurring.  The extended national discussion that is likely to accompany the process of adopting the Equality Act may have the same salutary effect.