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Posts Tagged ‘legislative intent’

Unanimous Utah Supreme Court Holds Exclusion of Same-Sex Couples Under Gestational Surrogacy Law is Unconstitutional

Posted on: August 7th, 2019 by Art Leonard No Comments

The Utah Supreme Court ruled on August 1 that a state law authorizing judicial approval of gestational surrogacy contracts was unconstitutional to the extent that it excluded married same-sex couples from being able to enter into an enforceable gestational surrogacy contract.  Finding that the offending provision is “severable” from the rest of the statute, the court sent the case back to a trial court for approval of the surrogacy agreement.  The case is In re Gestational Agreement, 2019 Westlaw 3521540, 2019 UT 40.

The opinion by Chief Justice Matthew B. Durrant refers to the parties by their initials.  N.T.B. and J.G.M., a gay male married couple, wanted to make an enforceable gestational surrogacy contract with D.B. and G.M., a different-sex married couple.  They had the appropriate papers drawn up and submitted them for approval to District Judge Jeffrey C. Wilcox in St. George.

Under Utah’s law governing gestational surrogacy, only married couples can make an enforceable gestational surrogacy contract, and for the contract to be legally valid, a judge must find that it meets a multi-part statutory test.  The intended parents must be a married couple, and the proposed gestational surrogate must be a married woman who has already borne at least one child and whose husband consents to the arrangement.  The statute does not specify that the intended parents must be a different-sex couple, but when this state was enacted in 2005, Utah had a constitutional provision banning same-sex marriages, so clearly the legislature was thinking of different-sex couples when it approved the statute.

In order for the judge to validate the agreement, he or she must find that “medical evidence shows that the intended mother is unable to bear a child or is unable to do so without unreasonable risk to her physical or mental health or to the unborn child.”  That is, Utah legislators did not want to validate surrogacy agreements where the intended parents wanted to pay somebody to bear their child for reasons of convenience, but only for reasons of medical necessity.

Taking this provision literally, Judge Wilcox reasoned that the statute’s use of the words “mother and her plainly refer to a woman,” so because “neither of the legally married intended parents are women the court must deny their petition.”  The judge rejected the petitioners’ argument that he should apply a gender-neutral interpretation to the statute, or that denying the married gay couple the right to make a valid gestational surrogacy contract was a violation of their constitutional rights.

They appealed the ruling, and the state’s Court of Appeals certified the case to go directly to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court faced several issues.  First, since the state was not a party and filed an amicus brief urging the court to interpret the statute to allow this contract to be validated, there was no traditional “case or controversy.”  Thus, the court had to confront the question whether it had jurisdiction over this case.  Chief Justice Durrant devoted a considerable portion of the opinion to that question, finding that in the field of family law there were various circumstances in which courts decide essentially uncontested cases because of statutory requirements for the exercise of judicial judgment, and this case fit easily into that exception to the general requirement that courts confine themselves to resolving disputes between contesting parties.  His opinion resulted in two members of the court writing concurring opinions focused solely on the jurisdiction issue, but the outcome had unanimous support of all the judges.

The second issue for the court was whether it could use a gender-neutral interpretation of the statute to get around the literal requirement found by Judge Wilcox that one of the intended parents must be a woman who is unable to bear a child for medical reasons.

The petitioners relied on a general “rule of construction” in the Utah code that “a word used in one gender includes the other gender.”  Judge Wilcox had acknowledged this, but noted that the same statute provides that the general rules of construction “shall be observed, unless the construction would be: (i) inconsistent with the manifest intent of the Legislature; or (ii) repugnant to the context of the statute.”  Wilcox found this proviso applicable, and so did Chief Justice Durrant.

Certainly, the intent of the legislature when the statute was enacted was to override the general common law rule against enforcement of surrogacy agreements, but only for a narrow range of cases in which traditionally-married couples who were unable for medical reasons to have a child without the assistance of a surrogate could make an enforceable surrogacy agreement subject to judicial oversight to protect the interests of all parties.  A judge had to approve the agreement to ensure that all interests, including those of the surrogate and the resulting child, were protected.

“Because the plain and ordinary meaning of the word ‘mother’ is ‘female parent,’” wrote Durrant, “we are bound, as the district court concluded it was, to read the statute as requiring that one of the intended parents be a female parent.”  He noted that following the state’s and the petitioners’ argument that the gender neutral construction rule should be followed, but this would come within both terms of the proviso: inconsistent with legislative intent and “repugnant” to the context of the statute.  He pointed out that a gender neutral reading could provide results clearly outside of the bounds that the legislature wanted to place on the use of gestational surrogacy.  If the words “intended mother” are read to mean “intended parent” without regard to gender, then a different sex couple could enter into a gestational surrogacy contract by showing that the husband is unable to bear a child.  “Because every opposite-sex couple could make this showing automatically,” wrote Dunnant, observing parenthetically that “every opposite-sex couple contains a male member and obviously a male cannot bear a child,” then this gender-neutral interpretation “would write the intended mother requirement out of the statute.”  Clearly, Dunnant has missed the occasional press reports about transgender men bearing children!

In any event, the court was unwilling to adopt a gender-neutral construction of the statute, leading to the next question faced by the court:  Does the requirement that the one of the intended parents be a woman violate the constitutional rights of the same-sex couple?  Here the court easily and unanimously found that it does under the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in Obergefell v. Hodges and Pavan v. Smith.  In the aftermath of the Obergefell decision, issued on June 26, 2015, lower courts had to decide whether Obergefell was a narrow decision, merely requiring that states allow same-sex couples to marry, or a broad decision under which the marriages of same-sex couples must be treated the same as other marriages under state law.

Justice Anthony Kennedy’s explanation in Obergefell of why the right to marry is a “fundamental right” did more than just imply that same-sex marriages had to enjoy equal rights, but some lower courts did not get that message.  The Arkansas Supreme Court, for example, ruled in Pavan v. Smith that the state could refuse to put the names of both women in a married couple on the birth certificate of their child because only one of the women was “biologically related” to the child.  The U.S. Supreme Court reversed.  Since the husband of a woman who gives birth is automatically listed on the birth certificate as a parent of the child, so must be a same-sex spouse, because the 14th Amendment requires that all marriages have equal rights.

Durrant found this clearly applicable to the present case.  The court found that the Utah statutory requirement that validation of a gestational agreement requires that at least one of the intended parents be female “squarely violates Obergefell in that it deprives married same-sex male couples of the ability to obtain a valid gestational agreement – a marital benefit freely provided to opposite-sex couples.  Under the statute, married same-sex male couples are treated differently than married opposite-sex couples.  Because under Obergefell same-sex married couples are constitutionally entitled to the ‘constellation of benefits that the States have linked to marriage,’ we hold the intended mother requirement . . . unconstitutional.”

This brought the court to the last question.  Was the entire surrogacy statute thus rendered unconstitutional, or could the statute be saved be severing the provision concerning the intended mother’s reproductive capacity and enforcing the statute without that provision for applications by same-sex couples?

The court noted that the legislature did not include an express severability provision in the statute, so the court was left to apply the general rule that a statute should be saved from being struck down on constitutional grounds if it was feasible to do so, and the court found it was feasible to do so in this case.  Durrant pointed out that the statute required the district court to make findings on eleven different issues. Subtracting this one left ten other issues, such as whether the consideration paid to a surrogate is “reasonable,” whether the surrogate has had a successful pregnancy in the past, whether a home study shows the intended parents meet the “standard of fitness applicable to adoptive parents” and so forth.  “Striking the intended mother requirement from this list does not reduce the significance of these other required findings,” he wrote.  “The district court should still be required to make findings on each of the additional ten conditions.  Severing the intended mother requirement from the statute does nothing to affect the operability of the remaining portions of the statute.”  Indeed, the court found that severing the intended mother requirement does nothing to “undermine” the purpose of the other provisions intended to protect the surrogate, the intended parents, and the child.

The parties are represented by Edwin S. Wall and Damian E. Davenport of Salt Lake City.  Utah Attorney General Sean D. Reyes, Solicitor General Tyler R. Green, and Assistant Solicitor General Brent A. Burnett submitted an amicus brief encouraging the court to adopt a gender-neutral interpretation of the statute, so as not to require a constitutional ruling.

This opinion is an important contribution to the growing body of cases adopting a broad construction of the precedential power of Obergefell v. Hodges and the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision of Pavan v. Smith.

Justice Department Tells 2nd Circuit That Gays Are Not Protected from Discrimination Under Federal Civil Rights Law

Posted on: July 27th, 2017 by Art Leonard No Comments

The U.S. Department of Justice filed a brief on July 26 with the New York-based U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit, weighing in on the question whether Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 bans discrimination because of sexual orientation.  Not surprisingly, the Trump Administration’s answer is “No.”

 

Title VII lists forbidden grounds for employment discrimination: race or color, religion, sex and national origin. After it went into effect in July 1965, both the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the agency charged with enforcement of the statute, and the federal courts quickly took the position that people who encountered discrimination because they were gay or transgender could not pursue a claim under this law.  Both the administrative agency and the federal courts held fast to that position until relatively recently.

 

That consensus began to break down early in this century, first in response to discrimination claims by transgender people, as courts and then the EEOC (in 2012) accepted the argument that discriminating against somebody because they were transitioning or had transitioned was actually discrimination because of sex. The rationale they adopted derived from a 1989 decision by the Supreme Court, which recognized that discrimination against people for failing to comply with the employer’s stereotyped view about how people of a particular sex should behave, dress, or otherwise act, was actually discrimination because of their sex.  The 1989 case involved a woman who was denied a partnership in an accounting firm because some of the partners thought she was not sufficiently feminine to meet their image of a “lady partner,” and her immediate boss told her she should get her hair styled and start wearing makeup and jewelry if she wanted to be a partner.

 

By 2015, the EEOC had taken the analysis one step further to cover sexual orientation claims. It recognized that having a same-sex attraction violates gender stereotypes, similarly to the transgender cases, but also drew analogies to cases where courts found that discriminating against an employee for being in an interracial relationship was a form of race discrimination, called associational discrimination.  Further, the EEOC decided that it was really not plausible to distinguish between sexual orientation discrimination and sex discrimination, since both were concerned with treating people differently because of their sex.

 

Until this year, no federal appellate court had accepted these theories, but on April 4, the full bench of the Chicago-based U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit became the first federal appeals court to rule that Title VII bans sexual orientation discrimination.  Reversing its prior precedents, the court accepted the EEOC’s analysis in a lawsuit by Kimberly Hively, a lesbian who had been denied a tenure-track position by an Indiana community college.  The college decided not to appeal, taking the position that it had not discriminated at all, so the case was sent back for trial to the district court.

 

Meanwhile, however, the same issue was being litigated in other parts of the country. In the Atlanta-based 11th Circuit, a sexual orientation discrimination claim by Jameka Evans against a Georgia hospital that had been dismissed by the district court was revived by the court of appeals, but on a narrower theory.  In common with several other circuits, the 11th Circuit will accept Title VII claims from gay plaintiffs who allege that they suffered discrimination because of their failure to conform to gender stereotypes.  In this case, while a three-judge panel ruled 2-1 to affirm the trial court’s rejection of the plaintiff’s sexual orientation discrimination claim, the panel sent the case back to the trial court to allow the plaintiff to pursue a sex stereotyping claim.  One member partially dissented, Judge William Pryor (who had been on Trump’s potential Supreme Court list), finding no basis for any Title VII claim by the plaintiff.  Another member of the court agreed to send the case back, but argued that Title VII should be interpreted to cover sexual orientation claims.  A third member found that the panel was bound by circuit precedent to reject the sexual orientation claim, but agreed that the plaintiff should have a chance to pursue a sex stereotype claim.  The 11th Circuit denied a petition to reconsider the Evans case “en banc” (by the full bench) a few weeks ago, and Lambda Legal announced that it will petition the Supreme Court to review the panel decision.  Lambda has until the first week of October to file its petition.

 

Meanwhile, however, within the 2nd Circuit, at least two federal district court judges have recently refused to dismiss sexual orientation claims under Title VII, finding that the circuit’s acceptance of the “associational theory” in a race discrimination case means that the court should accept sexual orientation discrimination claims.  Several other district judges have dismissed such claims, concluding that until the court of appeals explicitly overrules its earlier precedents, the trial judges are bound to follow them.  A few months ago, confronted by petitions for en banc review in three different cases, the Circuit announced that it would reconsider the panel decision in Estate of Donald Zarda v. Altitude Express.

 

In Zarda, the district court had dismissed a Title VII claim but allowed the case to go to trial under New York State’s Human Rights Law, which expressly outlaws sexual orientation discrimination. The jury ruled in favor of the employer, although it is questionable whether the jury was properly instructed about how to weigh the evidence.  The plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of the Title VII claim. A three-judge panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal, while noting that recent developments in the law could justify reconsideration by the full 2nd Circuit bench.  In a case decided by a different three-judge panel at around the same time, Christiansen v. Omnicom, the panel also upheld dismissal of a sexual orientation claim, but sent the case back to the district court for reconsideration as a sex stereotyping claim, and two of the judges joined a concurring opinion suggesting that it was time for the 2nd Circuit to reconsider the sexual orientation issue en banc in an “appropriate case.”  However, after granting en banc review in Zarda, the circuit court denied a petition for en banc review in Christiansen!

 

Briefs were due from the plaintiff’s side in the Zarda appeal during the last week in June. The EEOC, consistent with its interpretation of the statute, filed an amicus (friend of the court) brief in support of the Zarda. (Zarda, a sky-diving instructor, died in a diving accident after starting his discrimination case, so the lawsuit is now being pursued by his executors, seeking money damages for the estate.)    Briefs were due by July 26 from the employer and any amicus parties supporting its position.  After some suspense about what the Trump Administration might do, the Justice Department filed its brief right at the deadline.

 

It is somewhat unusual for the government to file an amicus brief in opposition to a position taken by a federal agency, and it is also unusual for the government to file a brief in a case between private parties – a former employee versus a business – but the federal government has a significant interest in this case, and the politics of EEOC v. DOJ are unusual because of the timing. Until this month, the majority of the EEOC Commissioners have been appointees of President Obama.  They decided the key sexual orientation case two years ago by a vote of 3-2, with the Republican commissioners dissenting.  Upon confirmation of Trump’s appointees to fill some vacancies, control of the EEOC will switch over to Republican hands.  But for now, the EEOC continues to pursue sexual orientation discrimination cases under Title VII, and has even filed some new lawsuits this year despite the change of administrations in January.  On the other hand, the Justice Department reflects the views of the new administration, which are consistent with those expressed by 7th Circuit Judge Diane Sykes (also on Trump’s potential Supreme Court list), who wrote a dissenting opinion in the Hively case.

 

Why does the Trump Administration have a strong interest in a case between private parties? Because Title VII has provisions banning sex discrimination in the federal workforce, and because the president’s political base and the Republicans in Congress stand in opposition to outlawing sexual orientation discrimination.  This is clear from the failure of Republican legislators to co-sponsor the Equality Act, a bill that would amend Title VII to add sexual orientation and gender identity or expression to the statutory list of forbidden grounds of employment discrimination.  A few Republicans were co-sponsors of the Employment Non-Discrimination Act, a narrower bill that was pending in Congress from the mid-1990s through Obama’s first term until it was supplanted by the Equality Act, but not enough to call that bipartisan legislation.  The Employment Non-Discrimination Act came up for floor votes once in each house of Congress but in different sessions of Congress.  On both of those occasions it received few votes from Republican legislators, and their party’s platform never endorsed it.

 

The Justice Department’s brief, noting the EEOC’s position in the case, states that “the EEOC is not speaking for the United States and its position about the scope of Title VII is entitled to no deference beyond its power to persuade.” And, almost needless to say, the Justice Department under the outspokenly anti-gay Jeff Sessions is not persuaded by any of the EEOC’s arguments.  The brief argues that Congress did not intend to ban sexual orientation discrimination in 1964 when it enacted Title VII and that should be the end of the matter.  The failure of Congress to approve any amendment to add sexual orientation to the law is cited as evidence of continuing legislative intent, and the brief argues that only Congress can change the law.  It argues at length that the theories embraced by the EEOC and the 7th Circuit are mistaken interpretations of the Supreme Court’s rulings on sex stereotyping and associational discrimination, and that there is a distinct difference between sex discrimination and sexual orientation discrimination, despite statements by many federal judges that they have difficulty drawing the line between the two.

 

The 2nd Circuit will not be oblivious to the political nature of the government’s opposition.  The concurring opinion in the Christiansen case, written by 2nd Circuit Chief Judge Robert Katzmann, virtually endorsed the EEOC’s interpretation of the statute while calling for the circuit to reconsider its earlier precedents.  And a majority of the judges who will sit on the en banc panel were appointed by Bill Clinton or Barack Obama and have generally taken a more liberal approach to interpreting Title VII.  The circuit’s earlier precedents that are being reconsidered were issued by three-judge panels at a time when the arguments for allowing sexual orientation discrimination claims were not nearly as well developed as they have been in recent years, and the circuit has accepted the associational discrimination theory in a race discrimination case after those earlier cases were decided.  It is likely to see that theory’s applicability here, as the district judges have commented.  However, if the Supreme Court decides to grant Lambda Legal’s petition to review the 11th Circuit case, it is possible that the 2nd Circuit will hold up on deciding the Zarda appeal until the Supreme Court has spoken.  Interesting timing issues will arise this fall.  The 2nd Circuit argument is scheduled for late in September, before the Supreme Court will begin its fall term and start announcing whether it will grant petitions for review filed over the summer.

 

The brief filed by Altitude Express in opposition to the appeal has raised significant jurisdictional arguments that would give the 2nd Circuit a way out of deciding this appeal on the merits, if the judges are so inclined.  That brief argues that when he filed his initial discrimination charge with the EEOC, Donald Zarda expressly disclaimed making a sexual orientation discrimination claim under Title VII, relying instead on the allegation that he suffered discrimination for failing to comply with sex stereotypes.  That was the theory he initially presented in his federal court complaint under Title VII as well, and it was dismissed by the trial judge, who opined that Zarda’s factual allegations were not sufficient for a sex stereotyping claim.  Zarda only pressed a sexual orientation claim under the New York State Human Rights Law.  Thus, Altitude Express argues, he cannot now argue for a sexual orientation discrimination claim under Title VII, because the statute requires that any claim first be presented to the administrative agency, and further that any ruling by the court of appeals on that question would be, in effect, an advisory opinion, as the jury has already ruled against his sexual orientation discrimination claim.  There’s no telling how the 2nd Circuit will respond to these arguments, but one suspects that if they had serious doubts about jurisdiction, they would not have granted the en banc petition.

 

In the meantime, however, it is clear that if the Supreme Court grants review in the 11th Circuit Evans case, the federal government, represented by the Solicitor General, will come into the case against the plaintiff, and by then the EEOC will be in Republican control and will probably not be filing a separate brief.  Once again, the Trump Administration is actively disavowing the LGBT-supportive stance that the candidate claimed during the election last year.  The brief was filed just as Trump was tweeting his decision to bar transgender people from military service, which seemed no coincidence.