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Federal Magistrate Judge Declares Idaho’s Ban on Same-Sex Marriage Unconstitutional

Posted on: May 14th, 2014 by Art Leonard No Comments

They just keep on coming… Hard on the heels of last week’s ruling by a state court judge in Arkansas that the state’s ban on same-sex marriages violates both the state and federal constitutions, a U.S. Magistrate Judge in Boise has ruled in Latta v. Otter that Idaho’s ban violates the 14th Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. Chief U.S. Magistrate Judge Candy Wagahoff Dale released her decision late on May 13, issuing an injunction against enforcement of the ban to become effective at 9 a.m. on May 16, unless it is stayed by judicial action. Anticipating this result, Governor C. L. (Butch) Otter had already filed a Contingent Motion to Stay Pending Appeal on Monday, with the expectation that Judge Dale will grant a stay pending Otter’s appeal to the 9th Circuit. News reports out of Idaho suggested that Idaho Attorney General Lawrence Wasden, as representative of the state government, would be filing his own motion. [Update: On Wednesday, May 14, Judge Dale denied the motion for a stay. The Governor and Attorney General sought an emergency stay from the 9th Circuit. A three-judge panel of the 9th Circuit granted a “temporary” stay while it considered the parties’ arguments concerning a stay pending appeal. As a result, the Magistrate’s order did not go into effect at 9 am on May 16.]

The parties had agreed to expedite the case by referring it for decision to Magistrate Judge Dale. Normally Magistrate judges deal with pretrial discovery matters and settlement conferences and issue recommendations to federal district judges, but in this case Judge Dale was authorized to issue a final decision on the merits.

Judge Dale’s decision closely resembles the long string of federal trial court decisions dating back to December in Utah, but it had one important distinguishing factor. This was the first decision by a federal trial court within the jurisdiction of the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals to rule on a marriage equality claim in light of the circuit court’s January 21 decision in SmithKline Beecham v. Abbot Laboratories. In that case, a three-judge panel decided that the Supreme Court’s U.S. v. Windsor decision, striking down Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act, had effectively invalidated prior 9th Circuit rulings on the question whether sexual orientation discrimination claims are subject to “heightened scrutiny.” When heightened scrutiny applies, the challenged law is presumed to be unconstitutional and the government bears the burden of proving that the law significantly advances an important government policy. Most legal commentators agree that a ban on same-sex marriage cannot survive heightened scrutiny review. The SmithKline panel found that, in light of how the Supreme Court dealt with the challenge to DOMA in Windsor, such claims should be subject to “heightened scrutiny.”

The defendants in the Idaho case — Governor Otter, Ada County Recorder Christopher Rich, who had denied marriage licenses to some of the plaintiffs, and the State itself as represented by Attorney General Wasden — argued that SmithKline was distinguishable from this case and should not apply. They argued that the SmithKline ruling limits application of heightened scrutiny to “instances of proven animus or irrational stereotyping,” but Judge Dale rejected this contention. “SmithKline addresses purposeful discrimination and the perpetuation of impermissible stereotypes,” she wrote, “but it does so in the context of Batson analysis [the Supreme Court’s precedent on discrimination against potential jurors] — not in the discussion about Windsor. With respect to Windsor, the court’s holding is undeniably broad: ‘Windsor’s heightened scrutiny applies to classifications based on sexual orientation.’ Had the Ninth Circuit intended to limit its holding to cases involving animus or irrational stereotyping, it easily could have done so. Instead it found Windsor to be ‘dispositive of the question of the appropriate level of scrutiny in this case,’ a case that fits into the broader category of ‘classifications based on sexual orientation.’ Just as the Ninth Circuit was ‘bound by Windsor’s controlling, higher authority’ when deciding SmithKline, this Court is bound to apply Windsor’s heightened scrutiny to Idaho’s Marriage Laws.”

Ironically, Judge Dale didn’t even have to engage with this argument to reach her result, as she had already concluded earlier in her opinion that the Idaho marriage law would be subjected either to strict scrutiny — the stiffest level of judicial review — or heightened scrutiny, because the law abridges a fundamental right: the right to marry. She firmly rejected the defendants’ argument that she was still bound to dismiss the case based on the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1972 rejection of a same-sex marriage challenge from Minnesota. Baker v. Nelson, on the ground that same-sex marriage did not present a “substantial federal question,” pointing out that all the federal courts ruling in marriage equality cases since the Windsor decision have rejected that argument as no longer tenable. Then she demolished the defendants’ argument that the plaintiffs are seeking “recognition of a new fundamental right, the right to same-sex marriage.” “This ‘new right’ argument attempts to narrowly parse a right that the Supreme Court has framed in remarkably broad terms,” wrote Judge Dale. “Loving was no more about the ‘right to interracial marriage’ than Turner was about the ‘prisoner’s right to marry’ or Zablocki was about the ‘dead-beat dad’s right to marry,'” she continued, invoking the Supreme Court’s leading marriage cases. “Even in cases with such vastly different facts, the Supreme Court has consistently upheld the right to marry, as opposed to a sub-right tied to the facts of the case.”

As such, of course, the Supreme Court has frequently referred to the “right to marry” as a right of fundamental importance, and spoke of it in similar terms in the Windsor decision last June. Furthermore, Judge Dale noted, “and most critically, the Supreme Court’s marriage cases demonstrate that the right to marry is an individual right, belonging to all. If every individual enjoys a constitutional right to marry, what is the substance of that right for gay and lesbian individuals who cannot marry their partners of choice? Traditional man-woman marriage is no answer, as this would suggest that gays and lesbians can switch off their sexual orientation and choose to be content with the universe of opposite-sex partners approved by the State. Defendants offer no other answer.”

Having settled on heightened scrutiny, Dale carefully reviewed each of the “justifications” proposed by the defendants for maintaining the ban, and found them all wanting. The notion that the ban advanced the state’s interest in the welfare of children struck her as “so attenuated that it is not rational, let alone exceedingly persuasive.” Rejecting the defendants’ attempt to rely on outlier “scientific” publications arguing that children need to have parents of both sexes in order to thrive, she wrote, “The best that can be said for Defendants’ position is that some social scientists quibble with the prevailing consensus that the children of same-sex parents, on average, fare no better or worse than the children of opposite-sex parents. But the Court need not — even if it could at the summary judgment stage — resolve this sociological debate. The parties’ debate over the scientific literature distracts from the essential inquiry into the logical link between child welfare and Idaho’s wholesale prohibition of same-sex marriage.” Indeed, she pointed out, denying same-sex couples the right to marry disregards “the welfare of children with same-sex parents,” she observed. “Although the State and Recorder Rich dismiss same-sex households as ‘statistically insignificant,’ no Defendant suggests that the State’s child welfare interest does not extend to the children in these households.”

Judge Dale was similarly dismissive of the ridiculous “channeling procreation” argument or “federalism” arguments, and was particularly critical of the argument that the ban was necessary to “accommodate religious freedom,” characterizing this argument as “myopic.” “No doubt many faiths around the world and in Idaho have longstanding traditions of man-woman marriage rooted in scripture,” she acknowledged, “But not all religions share the view that opposite-sex marriage is a theological imperative. In fact, some of the Plaintiffs actively worship in faiths that recognize and support their unions. To the extent that Governor Otter argues that Idaho has a legitimate interest in validating a particular religious view of marriage, that argument blithely disregards the religious liberty of congregations active in Idaho.” She went on to quote the Utah marriage decision on this point: “By recognizing the right to marry a partner of the same sex, the State allows these groups the freedom to practice their religious beliefs without mandating that other groups must adopt similar practices.”

Of course, no marriage equality decision would be complete without a quote from one of Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia’s dissenting opinions, in which he argued that the Supreme Court’s gay rights rulings were opening up the possibility of constitutional claims to the right to marry. Judge Dale quoted Scalia in the context of refuting the defendants’ argument that there is no evidence of animus against gay people in the Idaho ban. “Suggesting that the laws’ discriminatory effects are merely incidental, Defendants characterize them as efforts to preserve Idaho’s traditional civil marriage institution. ‘But “preserving the traditional institution” is just a kinder way of describing the State’s moral disapproval of same-sex couples,'” she quoted Justice Scalia’s dissent in Lawrence v. Texas, the 2003 case invalidating sodomy laws.

Concluding, Judge Dale wrote that the plaintiffs “are entitled to extraordinary remedies because of their extraordinary injuries. Idaho’s Marriage Laws withhold from them a profound and personal choice, one that most can take for granted. By doing so, Idaho’s Marriage Laws deny same-sex couples the economic, practical, emotional, and spiritual benefits of marriage, relegating each couple to a stigmatized, second-class status. Plaintiff suffer these injuries not because they are unqualified to marry, start a family, or grow old together, but because of who they are and whom they love.”

Grounding her decision firmly in the 14th Amendment, Judge Dale wrote, “While the Supreme Court has not expressly decided the issues of this case, it has over the decades marked the path that leads to today’s decision,” and concluded: “Slow as the march toward equality may seem, it is never in vain.”

Governor Otter’s “contingent” motion pointed to the Supreme Court’s January 6 stay of the Utah marriage decision, arguing that the “Supreme Court made clear that it will decide the constitutionality of man-woman marriage and until that time no lower court decision holding against man-woman marriage should operate to allow same-sex couples to marry or have their marriages recognized contrary to the law of their particular states.” If a stay is not granted, he argued, “there is likely to be a repetition in Idaho of the chaos, confusion, conflict, uncertainty, and spawn of further litigation and administrative actions seen in Utah and, to a lesser extent, in Michigan.” Presumably, Judge Dale will issue a ruling on this motion before her order can go into effect on Friday morning, but if she hasn’t issued a stay by Thursday afternoon, the Governor and Attorney General will undoubtedly petition the 9th Circuit for quick action.

Already pending at the 9th Circuit is an appeal by gay rights advocates of a pre-Windsor adverse ruling in the Nevada marriage equality case. That had been scheduled for argument in April, but the argument was postponed after a member of the circuit court asked to poll the entire Circuit on whether to reconsider the “heightened scrutiny” ruling in SmithKline Beecham v. Abbott Laboratories, which would obviously affect that case and subsequent marriage equality appeals. The time for briefing and polling having passed with no announcement by the court, it seems likely according to some observers that a majority of the court did not agree to reconsider that case, and the release of an order to that effect is likely awaiting the completion of a dissenting opinion by the judge who requested the poll and those who agreed with that judge. It is likely that the Nevada appeal will finally be heard over the summer, and perhaps in light of the timing will be heard by the same panel that will hear Governor Otto’s appeal of the Idaho ruling, following the pattern embraced by the 10th Circuit when it assigned the Utah and Oklahoma cases to the same three-judge panel.

Meanwhile, marriage equality suits are pending in trial courts within the 9th Circuit in Arizona, Oregon, and Alaska. In Oregon, a summary judgment argument has been held, while the court considers a motion to intervene by the National Organization for Marriage, which despite its name is an organization specifically formed to oppose marriage equality. If the court grants that motion, it would have to hold another summary judgment hearing before a decision could be rendered on the merits. NOM claims to represent several Oregon residents who could assert standing to intervene, including at least one county clerk who is not ready to have their name made public. Since the named defendants in the Oregon case agree with the plaintiffs, in the absence of an intervenor with legal standing a decision by Judge Michael McShane in favor of the plaintiffs could not be appealed to the 9th Circuit. Anticipating that possibility, Judge McShane raised the question at oral argument whether he should stay his own decision until the 9th Circuit has ruled on a marriage equality case from another state. [Update: On Wednesday, May 14, Judge McShane denied NOM’s intervention motion. That means he will move directly to deciding the motion for summary judgment.]

Four same-sex couples are plaintiffs in the case: Susan Latta and Traci Ehlers, Lori Watsen and Sharene Watsen, Shelia Robertson and Andrea Altmayer, and Amber Beierle and Rachael Robertson. Some of them seek to marry, while others, already married out-of-state, seek recognition of their marriages. They are represented by Boise attorneys Deborah A. Ferguson and Craig Durham and the National Center for Lesbian Rights, which had represented plaintiffs in the California marriage litigation that concluded with a historic marriage equality ruling by the California Supreme Court in 2008.

Circuit Judge Dings DOMA and Oregon Marriage Amendment in Grievance Ruling on Benefits

Posted on: April 26th, 2013 by Art Leonard No Comments
Judge Harry Pregerson of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit, sitting as Chair of the 9th Circuit’s Standing Committee on Federal Public Defenders, ruled that Alison Clark, an assistant federal public defender in the Office of the Federal Public Defender for the District of Oregon, is entitled to received coverage for her same-sex spouse under the Federal Employees Health Care Benefits Program.  In the Matter of Alison Clark, Case No. 13-80100 (9th Circuit, April 24, 2013) (unpublished).   In the course of reaching this decision, Judge Pregerson found that Oregon’s Measure 36, the 2004 ballot initiative that bans recognition of same-sex marriages in Oregon, violates the 14th Amendment, and he made a similar finding as to Section 3 of the federal Defense of Marriage Act.  Furthermore, he found that the federal government must recognize Clark’s same-sex marriage, contracted in Canada, even though she and her spouse live in a state where that marriage might not be recognized.
 

Clark married her same-sex partner, Anna Campbell, on June 23, 2012, in British Columbia, Canada.  A few weeks later, she applied for benefits under the Federal Employee Health Benefits Act, which applies to lawyers employed as federal public defenders.  The Act allows federal employees to elect family coverage, which can include their “spouse.”  The Administrative Office of the Federal Courts rejected the application, asserting that it was bound under Section 3 of DOMA to find that Campbell is not Clark’s spouse.  Furthermore, under Measure 36, Campbell and Clark are not recognized as spouses by their state of residence, either.  Clark filed a complaint under the Plan’s grievance system, arguing that the Benefit Plan’s own non-discrimination provision, which lists sexual orientation as a prohibited ground of discrimination, was violated, as well as the 5th Amendment equal protection and due process requirements.  Clark’s complaint ended up before the Committee, chaired by Judge Pregerson, and his opinion is consistent with rulings in two prior 9th Circuit cases presenting similar facts from federal court employees in California who had married in 2008 prior to the passage of Proposition 8, the main difference being that this marriage was contracted in Canada.

First Judge Pregerson found that this was an instance of sexual orientation discrimination, stating, “The only reason Clark was unable to make her spouse a beneficiary under the FEHB program was that, as a homosexual, she had a same-sex spouse.”  Thus, the Plan’s non-discrimination provision was violated.

Next, he addressed the issue of whether Oregon could refuse to recognize the marriage.  Before Measure 36 was passed, he observed, “Oregon law did not expressly limit marriage as between a man and a woman,” although the courts had construed the marriage law to be so limited.  Measure 36 amended the state constitution to provide: “It is the policy of Oregon, and its political subdivisions, that only a marriage between one man and one woman shall be valid or legally recognized as a marriage.”  Pregerson opined that heightened scrutiny was the appropriate standard to evaluate Clark’s claim, but that it was unnecessary to reach that issue because “Measure 26 fails under rational basis review.”  He pointed out that under the Supreme Court’s 1996 decision, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), “a classification treating homosexual individuals differently from heterosexual individuals cannot rationally be justified by the government’s animus towards homosexuality. . .  Here, Oregon does not state any reason for preventing same-sex couples from marrying.” 

Based on the arguments that had been made by proponents of California’s similarly-worded Prop 8 in Perry v. Schwarzenegger, Pregerson found that none of the purported state interests were “rationally related to prohibiting same-sex marriages.”  He made short work of the “responsible procreation,” “stable and enduring families for raising children,” and “proceed with caution in changing a basic social institution” arguments.   “While other possible objectives for Measure 36 exist,” he wrote, “I can see no objective that is rationallyr elated to banning same-sex marriages, other than the objective of denigrating homosexual relationships,” and such an objective would be impermissible under Romer.  Although he didn’t then go on to expressly  connect the dots, the implication was that Clark and Campbell’s marriage would be entitled to recognition in their state of residence, Oregon, as a matter of equal protection.

Having thus concluded, Pregerson did not need to address the alternative due process argument, but did so anyway.  He found that strict scrutiny should apply, because Supreme Court precedents supported the conclusion that the right to marry is a fundamental right.  However, again, he found that it wasn’t necessary to go this far, since Measure 36 flunked rational basis review, and thus, that Measure 36 “violates the due process rights of same-sex couples.”  “I next consider whether, given Clark and Campbell’s valid marriage, it is constitutionally permissible for the federal government to deny Clark’s request for spousal FEHB benefits.  I hold that it is not.”

Here, the barrier is Section 3 of DOMA.  Judge Pregerson found that “three rationales” for Section 3 listed in the House of Representatives report on DOMA to be insufficient under rational basis review.  He noted the Congressional Budget Office report, cited by the 1st Circuit in Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2012), to the effect that DOMA did not save the federal government money, because the net effect of repealing Section 3 would be to save money for the government, cost savings from recognizing same-sex families outweighing possible tax revenue losses.  Furthermore, he wrote, “there is no rational basis for distinguishing between same-sex couples and opposite-sex couples if the government’s objective is to cut costs.”  He concludes that Section 3 is unconstitutional under both the equal protection and due process requirements of the 5th Amendment.

The Obama Administration’s stance since February 2011 has been that Section 3 is unconstitutional but will be enforced until it is repealed or definitely invalidated by the courts.  The Supreme Court heard oral argument in March in United States v. Windsor, whose resolution may determine whether Section 3 is constitutional.  But Judge Pregerson is apparently not inclined to wait for that ruling.  Having held that denial of Clark’s application violates the Plan and the Constitution, provided a remedy.  “I therefore order the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Court to submit Clark’s FEHB Health Benefit Election form, which she signed and submitted on July 12, 2012, to the appropriate health insurance carrier.”  He also affirmatively orders that the Office process future “beneficiary addition requests without regard to (1) the sex of a listed spouse and (2) whether a validly executed same-sex marriage is recognized by a state.”   In case the federal Office of Personnel Management “blocks this relief,” he would alternatively order monetary relief, along the lines that the 9th Circuit has approved in the Levenson case from California, providing the funds necessary to compensate Clark for the cost of obtaining insurance coverage for her spouse.  This, of course, would cost the government more than including Clark’s spouse under the employee group insurance policy. 

Judge Pregerson’s ruling, which is non-precedential and only binds the parties, nonetheless takes on a question left hanging during the Windsor oral argument, of whether the constitution would require the federal government to recognize legally-contracted marriages, regardless where the married couple resides.  This is a significant question because state marriage laws generally do not have residency requirements, so many same-sex couples who live in states that do not authorize or recognize same-sex marriages have gone to other states (or countries, usually Canada) to get married, but are living in jurisdictions that don’t recognize their marriages.  When questioned about such situations during the Windsor argument, her counsel, Roberta Kaplan, stated that the plaintiff was only asking for federal recognition in states that recognized the marriages, but it is difficult to see how a federal constitutional right could be so cabined, and it would be unfortunate if the Supreme Court were to hold Section 3 invalid without addressing this question of broader application.