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New York Federal Judge Vacates Trump Administration “Conscience” Regulation

Posted on: November 12th, 2019 by Art Leonard No Comments

U.S. District Judge Paul A. Engelmayer issued an extraordinarily lengthy opinion on November 6, concluding that a regulation adopted by the Trump Administration’s Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) intended to protect from discrimination employees in the health care industry who refused to provide services because of their religious beliefs is invalid.   The case is State of New York v. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2019 WL 5781789, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 193207 (S.D.N.Y.).

 

The lawsuit was brought by a coalition of states, cities, Planned Parenthood, and a Family Planning and Reproductive Health services organization, that stood to lose substantial federal funding for their programs if they were found to violate the regulation, which imposed substantial compliance requirements on them.  They argued that the measure violated the First Amendment’s prohibition on an “establishment of religion.”  But Judge Engelmayer, rejecting a “facial” Establishment Clause challenge, instead premised his ruling on other arguments by the plaintiffs, asserting violations of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the Spending Clause and Separation of Powers requirements of the Constitution.

 

Judge Engelmayer summarized the Rule, which was adopted on May 21 (84 Fed. Reg. 23,170 – codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 88), originally set to go into effect on July 22, to “interpret and provide for the implementation of more than 30 statutory provisions that recognize the right of an individual or entity to abstain from participation in medical procedures, programs, services, or research activities on account of a religious or moral objection.”  The statutory provisions, usually added to particular laws as amendments offered by legislators during congressional consideration of the bills, are usually referred to as “conscience provisions.” After this lawsuit was filed, HHS agreed to delay the effective date of the regulation until November 22, so it has never actually gone into effect and will not go into effect any time soon unless the government obtains a stay of Judge Engelmayer’s opinion pending an appeal.

 

Most of the conscience provisions are intended to protect employees who refuse to participate in performing abortions, sterilizations, or assisted suicides, but some go further, extending to any medical practice or procedure, and theoretically could protect employees who refuse to provide services to LGBTQ people due to religious or moral objections.  While some of the provisions were aimed specifically at licensed health care professional employees who actually perform such procedures, others could theoretically apply to any employee – such as an orderly, an ambulance driver, or anybody else employed in a supportive or administrative role – whose religious or moral beliefs would be compromised by providing the service in question.

 

In addition to describing the various statutory conscience provisions, Judge Engelmayer noted a provision in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which requires employers to make a “reasonable accommodation” to the religious practices or beliefs of employees, with the test of reasonableness being whether the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the employer.  The Supreme Court has traditionally interpreted this provision to require employers to bear no more than a “de minimus” expense to accommodate religious objectors.

 

The George W. Bush administration promulgated a conscience regulation late in 2008 that was to take effect on the first day of the Obama Administration, but a legal challenge was filed and although “much of the rule” did take effect while the litigation continued, many contentious provisions were never rigorously enforced and HHS rescinded much of that Rule in 2011.

 

After taking office, President Trump issued an executive order titled “Promoting Free Speech and Religious Liberty,” which directed the Attorney General to “issue guidance interpreting religious liberty protections in federal law” and generally stating that the federal government should protect religious freedom to the extent possible under the Constitution.  On October 6, 2017, Attorney General Jeff Sessions issued a memorandum proclaiming that under the 1st Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause, an individual has “the right to perform or abstain from performing certain physical acts in according with one’s beliefs,” mentioning many of the statutory conscience provisions.  HHS then proceeded to issue a notice of proposed ruling-making to translate Sessions’ memorandum into written regulations, publishing its “final rule” on May 21, 2019.

 

Judge Engelmayer found that the 2019 Rule “substantially expands” on the 2008 Rule, applying to more than 30 conscience provisions (where the 2008 Rule applied to only three of them). He includes a detailed description of the Rule, including its very broad definition of which employees and entities are covered, a very broad definition of what counts as “discrimination,” and detailed procedures that employers in the health care field are supposed to follow to ensure that employees know about their rights to object or abstain, including requirements to certify their compliance with the Rule as a condition of receiving funding under federal programs, such as Medicare.  The stated intent of the Rules is to go as far as the Constitution and statutes allow in protecting those who object to doing their job because of religious, moral or ethical objections to particular procedures or practices by holding the loss of funding over employers who fail to accommodate religious objectors to the extent spelled out in the Rule.

 

The plaintiffs advanced five constitutional arguments against the rule.  They first argued that it violates the Establishment Clause, by forcing recipients of federal funds to “conform their business practices to the religious practices of their employees, imposing an absolute duty to accommodate such practices,” going far beyond the existing accommodation duty under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.  Second, they argued it violates the Spending Clause because the threat to withhold all federal funding for is “unconstitutionally coercive” and because the conditions it imposes are “ambiguous, retroactive, not reasonably related to the purpose of HHS’s programs under which the funds are provided, and thus unconstitutional.”  They argued that the Rule violates the constitutional separation of powers by, among other things, empowering the executive branch to unconstitutionally impound funds that Congress has appropriated.  They also made two Fifth Amendment arguments: void for vagueness as a result of ambiguities and inconsistences with other federal laws, inviting arbitrary enforcement; and violating the due process rights of patients to privacy and liberty, in particular by interfering with patients’ ability to obtain abortions and other procedures to which some health care workers object.

 

Judge Engelmayer rejected the government’s argument that the rule was merely a “housekeeping” measure intended to consolidate enforcement of the various statutory conscience provisions by centralizing enforcement in HHS’s Office of Civil Rights and to standardize definitions and requirements that varied among the thirty statutes.  Instead, he found, the Rule made substantive changes in the law.

 

“On this threshold dispute,” wrote the judge, “there is a definite answer.  Although the 2019 Rule has housekeeping features, plaintiffs’ description of it as largely substantive – and, indeed, in key respects transformative—is correct.  And HHS’s characterization of the Rule as solely ministerial cannot be taken seriously.”  He noted that the government had actually abandoned this position during oral argument.  “Whether or not the rule was properly adopted,” he wrote, it “unavoidably would shape the primary conduct of participants through the health care industry. It would upend the legal status quo with respect to the circumstances and manner in which conscience objections must be accommodated.  And the maximum penalty the Rule authorizes for a violation of the Conscience Provisions – the termination of all of a recipient’s HHS funding, from whatever program derived – is new, too.”

 

Supporting this conclusion, Judge Englemayer explained how the rule vastly expanded employers’ religious accommodation requirements under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, how it substantially broadened the definition of “protected activities” of religious objectors, down to the level of protecting a receptionist who might refuse to schedule a patient for a procedure to which the receptionist has ethical objections.  Unlike the statutory conscience provisions, he noted, the Rule would “for the first time” permit “abstention from activities ancillary to a medical procedure, including ones that occur on days other than that of the procedure.”  It also extended the definition of “covered entities” from health care providers to pharmacists and medical laboratories, and significantly expands the financial exposure of covered entities by authorizing draconian cut-offs of funding.

 

Judge Engelmayer decided the Rule is not a facial violation of the Establishment Clause, which would require finding that all of its provisions are unconstitutional in all their potential applications, but he acknowledged that it could be challenged “as applied” to particular situations – a test that might never arise because of his action in declaring the Rule invalid on other grounds.

 

First, the judge found that HHS did not comply with the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act governing the adoption of regulations, by going beyond the limits of rulemaking authority.  Agencies must base their rules and regulations on statutory policy decisions expressed by Congress, and cannot engage in legislating beyond those policy decisions.  The judge found that in this Rule HHS went over the line into legislation, especially noting the way the Rule expanded definitions, covered entities, enforcement authority, and penalties.  He found that HHS did not have authority under the APA to make all of these substantive legal changes without specific authorization in the statutes.

 

The sheer scale of the Rule’s potential impact played a large part in the decision.  The judge found that the Rule “puts in jeopardy billions of dollars in federal health care funds.  In fiscal year 2018, for example,” he wrote, “the State Plaintiffs received $200 billion in federal health care funding.  New York alone received $46.9 billion. The Provider Plaintiffs similarly received hundreds of millions in funding from HHS.”  He also noted the political significance of the Rule, as it took positions beyond those actually taken by Congress on such controversial issues as abortion and assisted suicide.

 

“In a case involving economic consequences and political dynamics on such a scale,” wrote the judge, “the Supreme Court teaches that ‘we expect Congress to speak clearly’ were it to delegate rulemaking authority. . .  Far from speaking clearly here, in none of the three statutes at issue did Congress give any indication that it intended to subcontract the process of legal standard-setting to an administrative agency in particular, or HHS in particularly,” noting that the three principal statutes with Conscience Provisions don’t even mention HHS.  And, the judge rejected the government’s contention that such a delegation was “implicit” in the enactment of those conscience provisions.  He noted that the Supreme Court had rejected a similar “implicit delegation” argument in connection with its interpretation of Title VII’s accommodation provisions and the attempts by the EEOC to interpret them.

 

He also concluded that HHS did not act in accordance with law in promulgating the rule, having taken shortcuts (rather typical of the Trump Administration) in skirting the detailed procedures set out in the APA.  The two most important flaws the court found were establishing rules that conflict with Title VII, and rules conflicting with the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTLA), by purporting to authorize employees with religious objections to withhold services in emergency situations.  The judge found that two basic Title VII concepts that the Rule “overrides” are key components of the specific language Congress adopted in 1972 amendments to Title VII “to address workplace religious objections.”  An agency cannot displace express statutory provisions by adopting a contrary rule.  Similarly, he noted that EMTLA “does not include any exception for religious or moral refusals to provide emergency care” and courts had declined to “read in” exceptions to that statute’s mandates, but the HHS Rule “applies in emergency-care situations,” purporting to create a “conscience exception” in a law that does not have one.

 

Also, turning to the APA’s substantive requirements, an agency that is adopting a rule that changes the law is required to document the need for such a change.  In this case, HHS just lied, claiming that there had been a substantial increase in complaints by health care employees about being forced to perform objectionable procedures or being disciplined for refusing to do so.  “In fact, upon the Court’s review of the complaints on which HHS relies,” wrote Engelmayer, “virtually none address the Conscience Provisions at all, let alone indicate a deficiency in the agency’s enforcement capabilities as to these laws.  And HHS, in this litigation, admitted that only a tiny fraction of the complaints that its Rule invoked as support were even relevant to the Conscience Provisions.  A Court ‘cannot ignore the disconnect between the decision made and the explanations given,’” he wrote, quoting from Chief Justice John Roberts’ opinion in June striking down the Trump Administration’s attempt to add citizenship questions to the 2020 Census Forms.  In that case, the Supreme Court found evidence that the Administration wanted to add the questions for political purposes, but prompted the Justice Department to come up with a phony justification invoking data needs to enforce the Voting Rights Act, even though experts in the Census Bureau warned that adding the questions would make the Census count less accurate by deterring non-citizens resident in the U.S. from participating.  He pointed out that the large majority of religiously-connected complaints received by HHS had to do with vaccinations, “which HHS admits fall outside the scope of the Conscience Provisions and the Rule.”

 

He also found unconvincing other explanations offered by HHS, and was especially critical of ways in which the Final Rule differed from the Rule as it was originally proposed and published for public comment concerning the definition of “discrimination.”  The judge concluded, in sum, that failed procedures in adopting the Rule under the APA were sufficient to invoke the court’s authority to declare the rule invalid and order it to be “vacated.”

 

But there was more, because the judge also found constitutional violations both of separation of powers and the Spending Clause.

 

Judge Engelmayer focused on the Rule’s remedial provision authorizing the termination of all HHS funding to an entity found to have violated the Rule, finding that this had not been authorized by Congress.  Thus, its adoption was a serious violation of the separation of powers.  He agreed with plaintiffs that the Rule “is inconsistent with the separation of powers because it allows HHS to withhold congressionally-appropriated federal funds to an extent that neither the [statutory] Conscience Provisions nor any other statute authorizes.  By claiming the power to do so, plaintiffs argue, HHS arrogates to itself, an executive agency, a power the Constitution allocates uniquely to Congress.”

 

Responding to this argument, the judge pointed out that an agency “must exercise its delegated spending authority consistent with specific congressional grant” and that an “agency may not withhold funds in a manner, or to an extent, unauthorized by Congress.” Thus, the remedial provision of the Rule exceeds the agency’s authority.

 

Furthermore, he found other violations specifically routed in the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Spending Clause.  He noted four principles relevant to this case: “conditions based on the receipt of federal funds must be set out unambiguously,” the “financial inducement offered by Congress” must not be “impermissibly coercive,” the conditions must relate “to the federal interest in the project and to the overall objective thereof,” and “the power may not be used to induce the States to engage in activities that would themselves be unconstitutional.”  Judge Engelmayer found it clear that the Rule violated at least the first two of these principles, pointing to specific ambiguities and internal contradictions in the Rule. And the draconian forfeiture of all funding as a remedy for a violation of the Rule was “impermissibly coercive.”

 

Finally, he concluded that the faults he had detected merited an order to the agency to vacate the Rule.  He pointed out that it has long been “standard practice under the APA” for a court to order that a rule be vacated when the court determines that “agency regulations are unlawful.”  He quoted a Supreme Court opinion on point, stating that “regulations subject to the APA cannot be afforded the force and effect of law if not promulgated pursuant to the statutory minimum found in that Act.”  The APA itself says that a court shall “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions” that the court finds to be “arbitrary and capricious, not in accordance with law, in excess of statutory authority, unconstitutional, or made without observance of procedures required by law.”

 

The judge rejected the government’s suggestion that he could go through the Rule stripping out objectionable parts and letting the rest go into effect, commenting that “the APA violations that the Court has found… are numerous, fundamental, and far-reaching.  The Court’s finding that HHS lacked substantive rule-making authority as to three of the five principal Conscience Provisions nullifies the heart of the Rule as to these statutes.  The Court’s finding that the agency acted contrary to two major existing laws (Title VII and EMTALA) vitiates substantive definitions in the Rule affecting health care employment and emergency contexts.  The Court’s finding that HHS failed to give proper notice of the definition it adopted of “discriminate or discrimination” voids that central dimension of the Rule.”  Letting a few selected provisions go into effect would “ignore the big picture: that the rulemaking exercise here was sufficiently shot through with glaring legal defects as to not justify a search for survivors.”

 

He also rejected HHS’s suggestion, common to Trump Administration arguments when courts are finding its executive actions invalid, that his order should be limited in effect to the Southern District of New York, or just to the named plaintiffs in the case, pointing out that this would lead to a proliferation of litigation around the country “to assure that such a Rule was never applied,” finding plenty of precedential support for this position in prior court of appeals opinions supporting trial court orders to vacate unlawfully promulgated rules.

 

“The Conscience Provisions recognize and protect undeniably important rights,” wrote Engelmayer.  “The Court’s decision today leaves HHS at liberty to consider and promulgate rules governing these provisions.  In the future, however, the agency must do so within the confines of the APA and the Constitution.”

Federal Court Orders State Department to Issue Gender-Neutral Passport to Intersex Applicant

Posted on: September 24th, 2018 by Art Leonard No Comments

U.S. District Judge R. Brooke Jackson has ordered the U.S. State Department to issue a gender-neutral passport to Dana Alix ZZyym, who was identified as female at birth but who rejects the gender binary, identifying neither as male nor female. Lambda Legal represents Zzyym in this long-running lawsuit in the federal trial court in Denver.  Zzyym v. Pompeo, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160018, 2018 WL 4491434 (D. Colo., September 19, 2018).

 

Zzyyym is described by Judge Jackson as “an intersex individual” who submitted a passport application in September 2014. In common with many intersex people, Zzyym uses the pronouns they, them, and their, but Judge Jackson skirts the pronoun issue by using ZZyym’s gender-neutral first name throughout the opinion in place of pronouns.

 

“Instead of checking the box labeled ‘M’ for male or ‘F’ for female on the application form, Dana instead wrote ‘intersex’ below the ‘sex’ category,” wrote Jackson. “By separate letter Dana informed the passport authorities that Dana was neither male nor female.  The letter requested ‘X’ as an acceptable marker in the sex field to conform to International Civil Aviation Organization (‘ICAO’) standards for machine-readable travel documents.  It is undisputed that in every other respect Dana is qualified to receive a passport.”

 

But the State Department denied the application. At the bureaucratic level at which passports are processed, there is no flexibility.  One must selection M or F or be denied.  In the denial letter, the Department said it would issue Dana a passport listing their gender as “female” because that was the sex listed on the driver’s license that they submitted to prove Dana’s identity.  Or, said the Department, Dana could have M listed if they provided “a signed original statement on office letterhead from your attending medical physician” attesting to their “new gender.”  Obviously, the low-level bureaucrats at State had trouble getting their heads around the concept of intersex, confusing it with transgender.

 

Dana submitted a letter appealing this denial, including “two sworn statements by physicians from the United States Department of Veterans Affairs Medical Center in Cheyenne, Wyoming, that verified Dana’s sex as ‘intersex.’” Dana also personally presented their case at the Colorado Passport Agency, explaining why they did not want their passport to indicate M or F.

 

But the Department persisted, explaining that it could not issue a passport unless the gender box was checked off as M or F. Why?  Because.  The form requires it.  Dana requested reconsideration, which was turned down in April 2015.

 

This led to the lawsuit, originally against Obama Administration Secretary of State John Kerry (in his official capacity), now against Michael Pompeo, as well as Director Sherman Portell of the Colorado Passport Agency. The lawsuit made multiple claims for relief, foremost arguing that the Department’s conduct was “arbitrary and capricious” in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act, which requires that agency action be undertaken for a reason.  The lawsuit also argued that by imposing this gender choice requirement the Department exceeded the authority delegated to it by Congress in the statutes governing issuance of passports, and that it violated 5th Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection rights. As relief, Zzyym ask the court to issue a “writ of mandamus” to compel the Department to issue a passport “accurately reflecting the plaintiff as intersex.”

 

On November 16, 2016, Judge Jackson ruled that “the agency’s decision-making process was not rational based upon the evidence in the record,” but rather than issue the requested writ of mandamus, he decided to send the case back to the Department for “reevaluation of its gender policy.” Too late, unfortunately, as this ruling was issued the week after Donald Trump’s election as president.  So it eventually fell into the lap of the new Trump-appointed leadership of the State Department, and one can only speculate about the puzzlement and consternation it may have caused in the new fact-free world of the Trump Administration.

 

“In March 2017, while the Department was reevaluating the policy, Dana requested that the Department issue a full-validity or temporary passport bearing an ‘X’ or other third-gender marking in the sex field in order for Dana to attend an international conference,” wrote Judge Jackson. But the Department refused. Why?  Need you ask?  No reason, just no.  The refusal letter did state, however, that the Department “would soon complete its review of the policy,” but you know where this leading.  On May 1, the Department again denied Dana’s application, issuing a memorandum purporting to “explain” its decision, but the explanation really just boiled down to a version of “that’s the way it is.”

 

Dana moved to reopen the case and their counsel filed a supplemental complaint to reflect the Department’s May action, seeking “injunctive relief and a judicial declaration that the State Department has exceeded its authority under the Administrative Procedure Act and has violated the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.” In his ruling of September 19, Judge Jackson explains that there is no need to address the constitutional claim because the matter can be resolved in ZZyym’s favor under the APA.

 

Judge Jackson noted that U.S. passports did not record gender prior to 1976, when the Department “changed course and added a male and female checkbox. The applicant is required to choose one or the other.  In my order dated November 22, 2016, I found that the administrative record did not show that the Department’s decision-making process that resulted in the gender policy was rational.  The reasons provided by the Department for the policy failed to show a reasoned decision-making process and instead seemed to be ad hoc rationalizations for the binary nature of the gender field.”

 

The new memorandum issued by the Department fared no better. In the memo, the Department showed awareness that some other countries have accommodated non-binary individuals by using an “X” on travel documents, and they can be scanned by the standard passport reading equipment in use at border crossings and airports.  Now the Department advances five “reasons” for its “gender policy.”

 

First, the Department argued that requiring a gender selection of M or F helps to ensure the accuracy and verifiability of a passport holder’s identity, for which the Department relies on state-issued documents, such as birth certificates and driver’s licenses. Secondly, the sex of a passport applicant is a “vital data point in determining whether someone is entitled to a passport” since “the Department must data-match with other law enforcement systems” all of which “recognize only two sexes.”  Thus, State argues, “continued use of a binary option for the sex data point is the most reliable means to determine eligibility.”  The Department also argued that “consistency of sex data point ensures easy verification of passport holder’s identity in domestic contexts.”  In essence, they argue that introducing a third sex marker on passports could “introduce verification difficulties in name checks and complicate automated data sharing among these other agencies,” which would “cause operational complications.”  The Department also contended that “there is no generally accepted medical consensus on how to define a third sex.”  While acknowledging that people such as Dana exist, “the Department lacks a sound basis in which to make a reliable determination that such an individual has changed their sex to match that gender identity.”  This explanation suggests they don’t understand the difference between transgender and intersex.  Finally, they argued, they had to stick with the current policy because “changing it would be inconvenient.”  In other words, a totally bureaucratic response focused on technical convenience and unresponsive to the need to deal with individuals as they are.

 

“Looking at the proffered reasons and cited evidence provided by the Department,” wrote the judge, “I find that the Department’s decision is arbitrary and capricious,” and he went through the reasons step by step, explaining why they failed to show “rational decision making,” which is the minimal requirement under the APA to sustain an administrative decision. He showed how the earlier responses to Dana’s application undermined the explanations provided in the memorandum.  Even though M and F do not accurately identify Dana, the Department insists on using them, thus contradicting its explanation that it clings to the binary system for purposes of “accurate” identification of people.  And the judge found that the administrative record included data at every turn that contradicted the Department’s conclusions.

 

Most tellingly, there was never any real explanation as to why somebody’s sex needs to be indicated on their passport that would justify refusing to accommodate intersex people. “Apparently,” wrote Jackson, “the data field of ‘SEX (M-F)’ was recommended because experts thought ‘that with the rise in the early 1970s of unisex attire and hairstyles, photographs had become a less reliable means for ascertaining a traveler’s sex.”  Additionally, as naming conventions changed, relying on first names to identify sex became problematic.  An ICAO report from 1974 recommended adding the sex markers as an aid to identification, and at that time the recommendation was to add M-F as the indicators.  But since then the ICAO has modified its standards to use “X” for “unspecified,” so relying on the ICAO recommendation of 1974 no longer justifies refusing to use the “X”.

 

The court found that the Department contradicts itself by relying on the same sort of authorities to deal with transgender people’s passport applications as would be relied upon in transgender cases. Jackson pointed out that “the information relied upon in the administrative record also reflects a lack of consensus as to how individuals born intersex could be classified as either ‘male’ or ‘female,’” but “this has not prevented the Department from requiring intersex people to elect, perhaps at random, as it doesn’t seem to matter to the Department which one of those two categories Dana chooses.” The lack of a medical consensus is thus irrelevant to the Department’s current practices.

 

Finally, turning to the inconvenience and expense argument, Jackson notes that it is merely asserted without any data to back it up. “True,” he wrote, “common sense would tell anyone that altering a system will necessarily involve some effort and money.  However, the Department’s rationale here is the product of guesswork rather than actual analysis, and it does not rise to the level of reliable evidence that is needed to show that the Department’s policymaking was rational.”

 

Actually, Jackson concluded, the new memorandum “added very little” to what was presented to the court in 2016. Jackson also ruled against the Department on Zzyym’s argument that denying them a passport exceeded the Department’s delegated powers.  Congress has delegated to the Department the decision to deny passports for a variety of reasons, but, wrote Jackson, “The authority to issue passports and prescribe rules for the issuance of passports under 22 U.S.C. section 211a does not include the authority to deny an applicant on grounds pertinent to basic identity, unrelated to any good cause. . .”

 

“Because neither the Passport Act nor any other law authorizes the denial of a passport application without good reason,” concluded Jackson, “and adherence to a series of internal policies that do not contemplate the existence of intersex people is not good reason, the Department has acted in excess of its statutory authority.”

 

The court determined to grant Zzyym the injunctive relief they sought. “Dana has been pursuing a passport for close to four years now,” he wrote.  “I grant Dana’s request for injunctive relief and enjoin the Department from relying upon its binary-only gender marker policy to withhold the requested passport from Dana.”  The judge concluded that a writ of mandamus was not necessary, as injunctive relief would suffice.  Will the Trump Administration comply or pursue a pointless appeal?

 

Advocacy for Dana drew in several pro bono cooperating attorneys, local counsel from Denver, and Lambda Legal attorneys Camilla Bronwen Taylor, M. Dru Levasseur, and Paul David Castillo.